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Introduction 
 
The effects of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) have been the subject of considerable 
debate dating back to the 1950’s when Jacob Viner published his work on the “customs 
union issue” – an era known as “the first regionalism.” More recent growth of RTAs has 
again sparked an interest among economic researchers.  For example, over the last ten 
years the United States (U.S.) has signed a total of 13 free trade agreements.  The 
European Union (EU) has successfully increased its membership from 6 members in 
1986 to 25 members in December of 2002 (European Commission). Other examples 
include Mercosur (The Southern Common Market) that was created in March 1991, the 
signing of the Andean Pact in 1993 and several South African trade agreements including 
the South African Development Community (SADC) formed in 1992, the South African 
Customs Union formed in 1993 and the Community of Eastern and Southern African 
Countries (COMESA) formed in 1995. In 2004, the World trade Organization (WTO) 
notifications show that there were over 190 agreements in force with another 60 believed 
to be operational although not yet notified. By 2005, this number is expected to approach 
300.  Bhagwati (1991) has termed this latest resurgence as “the second regionalism.”  
The proponents of regional trade agreements argue that they promote free trade. 
This school of thought views RTAs as “building blocks” towards multilateral trade 
liberalization (Summers1991; Ethier 1998). However, there are equally as many 
opponents who argue that RTAs divert trade from more efficient nonmember trading 
countries. This school of thought views RTAs as “stumbling blocks” that are likely to 
lower global welfare and divert import flows from lower cost suppliers (Panagariya 2000; 
Krueger 1999).   3 
Another issue raised by the formation of RTAs is their relationship with 
multilateral free trade.  The proliferation of RTAs has been concurrent with the 
multilateral negotiating rounds of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
These negotiations dramatically reduced tariffs and other border protection on industrial 
products where the current Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff rate is estimated at less 
than 5%. Yet, the same is not true for trade in agricultural products where the current 
MFN tariff rate is estimated at 62%. In fact, due to its sensitive nature, agriculture was 
virtually excluded from all eight GATT rounds until the signing of the Uruguay Round 
(UR) in 1994.  
The special treatment of agriculture is not uncommon in regional trade 
agreements. For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and 
Mercosur liberalized trade in most agricultural products but maintain trade barriers for 
sensitive products such as sugar, dairy and fruit and vegetable products. Mexico and 
Canada required a separate bilateral agreement within NAFTA for trade in dairy, poultry, 
eggs and sugar.  At two extremes, the Asian Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) excluded 
agricultural trade altogether, whereas the EU customs union and the Closer Economic 
Relations (CER) agreement between Australia and New Zealand permit free trade in 
agriculture (Jaysinghe and Sarker, 2003).  Clearly, the tremendous growth in regional 
trade agreements during the 1990’s suggests that these agreements are a force that is 
potentially competing with, if not surpassing multilateralism as an avenue for agricultural 
trade liberalisation.   
Typically, debates over the effects of regional trade agreements have focused on 
welfare.  However, to fully understand the effects of these agreements we seek to answer   4 
a more fundamental question of what effects these agreements have had on agricultural 
trade. The purpose of this study is to assess the effects of regional trade agreements in 
agricultural trade by specifying an extended gravity model.  Specifically this study 
addresses two important questions: (1) To what extent have RTAs created trade across 
individual agricultural commodities, and (2) To the extent that RTAs were trade creating, 
how much of this increase came at the expense of trade diversion with non-members?      
  This study is organized as follows.  The next section develops the well known 
gravity equation to estimate trade creation and trade diversion effects of eight regional 
trade agreements.  The econometric results follow and in the final section we conclude. 
The Gravity Model  
There are two possibilities that emerge when a group of countries form a Free Trade 
Agreement (FTA)
2.  In the case of trade diversion, higher cost imports from a bloc 
member replace lower cost foreign supplies and the RTA is said to be “trade diverting” 
from the most efficient supplier.  In the case of trade creation, if a member is originally 
trading with a relatively higher cost exporter before the RTA is formed, but the formation 
of the RTA displaces trade with lower cost exports from a member country then the RTA 
is said to be “trade creating.”  In the case of trade diversion, world trade is reduced and at 
least one country is made worse off if the external tariff is greater than the cost difference 
between the FTA and non-member sources.  In the case of trade creation, world output 
rises and the FTA member is better off in terms of economic welfare without a 
                                                 
2 In this study, free and preferential trade agreements, customs unions and common markets are used 
synonymously to refer to a regional trade agreement.  In a free trade area (FTA), countries enforce 
discriminatory trade policies by eliminating all tariff and political barriers to imports that originate wholly 
or in substantial measure (as determined by rules of origin) within the trading bloc.  A customs union (CU), 
on the other hand, is a free trade area in which member countries also adopt a common set of external 
tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other measures to limit imports from outside of the union.  A common 
market involves unrestricted movements of factors across an economic union in which fiscal, monetary and 
other economic policies are harmonized within the union (De Rosa 1998).   5 
corresponding welfare loss to the non-FTA member. Furthermore, lower internal 
consumption prices and a normal tradable good induce a positive substitution and income 
effect from lower import prices. 
    The gravity model has performed remarkably well as an empirical framework for 
measuring the impact of regional integration arrangements (Frankel and Wei 1995; 
Frankel, Stein and Wei 1995; Finger, Ng and Soloaga 1998). This literature commonly 
reports that trade creation has occurred within RTAs, although Finger, Ng and Soloaga 
and some others have found negative trade creation effects in Mercosur. However, the 
current gravity literature on regional integration has focused almost exclusively on trade 
in non-agricultural products, and in many cases, agricultural trade has been excluded 
from the estimation. Yet, the special treatment of agricultural trade within preferential 
trading blocs and in the WTO negotiations suggests that agricultural trade within RTAs 
may not be trade creating. Furthermore, by comparing the magnitudes of trade creation 
and trade diversion within a particular RTA, we can calculate a rough welfare estimate as 
well as the ad valorem equivalent pre-RTA border effect across several individual 
agricultural commodities.   
    Anderson (1979) provided the first theoretical foundation for the gravity model 
based on the properties of the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) expenditure 
system.  Bergstrand (1985, 1989), Helpman and Krugman (1985) and Deardorff (1998) 
have subsequently contributed to the micro foundations of the gravity model.  In the one-
sector monopolistic competition models (Krugman 1980), utility is CES over varieties 
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Assuming monopolistic competition among firms and iceberg transportation costs leads 
to the following result.  Each firm produces a unique variety so that it may have 
monopoly power over that variety expressed as a markup of price (p) over marginal cost 




σ .  The number of varieties produced in each country is determined by 
the available labor force (L), the size of the fixed costs (a) and the substitution elasticity 
(σ),  . σ a L n j j =  Variation in pricing across export markets is determined entirely by the 
iceberg transport cost factor, so if pj is the exporter’s price exclusive if trade barriers and 
tij ≥ 1 is the ad valorem trade cost, the price faced by importer i is p = pjtij. Consumers in 
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Thus, in its basic form the gravity model regresses the logarithm of the volume of trade 
(VTij) between countries i and j in year t on the logarithm of the economic size of the   7 
importing region i (GDPit  ) and exporting region j (GDPjt) and the logarithm of the 
distance between them (Dij): 
[4]  , ln ln ln ln 5 2 1 0 ijt ij jt it ijt D GDP GDP V ε β β β β + + + + =  
where the shipments between any two exporting (i) and importing (j) countries and their 
economic size (GDPi and GDPj) are measured in values (US$).  The distance variable 
(Dij) is a proxy for the transportation costs between countries i and j and (εijt) is a log 
normal error term.   
  We are interested in a model that captures the trade flow effects of regional trade 
agreements. McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1996) include domestic trade, along with a 
variable to indicate flows that take place within Canadian provinces as well as trade 
between Canadian provinces and U.S. states. Because the idea is to try and control for all 
the possible factors that explain why two nations may trade more with each other relative 
to the average flow of goods, the variables in equation [4] alone are not enough.  
  Researchers typically experiment by including proxies for trade costs such as the 
distance between partners, and indicators for common language and contiguity (when 
countries share land borders).For example, two nations that share a common border or 
speak a common language may trade more with each other based on relative proximity 
and cultural similarity.  Or, countries with access to seaports may have a comparative 
advantage in trade relative to neighbors who are landlocked. Controlling for these factors 
gives us more confidence that our regional bloc dummies are picking up structural 
increases in trade following the signing of an RTA.  The basic extension of equation [4] 
is as follows:   8 
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where Contij, CommLangij and LandLckij are dummy variables equal to one if exporter (i) 
and importer (j) share a common land border, speak a common language or are 
landlocked countries and zero otherwise
3.   
  The dummy variables TradeCijht and TradeDijlt are designed to capture trade creation 
or trade diversion effects respectively in agri-food trade for eight RTAs (h, l = 1…8).  
The specification of these dummies is related to the work of Frankel and Wei (1998) 
where the dummy variable TradeCij equals one if countries i and j belong to a particular 
RTA and the year (t) is greater than or equal to the year the agreement was signed.  The 
sign and magnitude of the coefficient indicates whether the creation of a particular RTA 
has stimulated or depressed intra-regional agricultural trade.
4   
  The trade diversion dummy variable (TradeDijlt) is designed to estimate how much of 
the increase (if any) in trade creation came as a result of trade diversion from nonmember 
sources.  Trade diversion is defined in terms of import costs (Viner 1950).  This variable 
takes the value one when an RTA member imports from a nonmember and the year (t) is 
greater than or equal to the year the agreement was signed.  Thus, the coefficient will 
                                                 
3 Note that one or both of the importing (exporting) country may be landlocked in which case the dummy 
variable equals one.  A landlocked country is taken from Wikopedia’s online encyclopedia 
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Landlocked) and is defined as a country that has no coastline.  There are 42 
landlocked countries in the world. 
4 A special case involves trade between Australia and New Zealand, members of the CER agreement.  This 
agreement was ratified in 1983, but our sample period is from 1985-2002.  Thus, the trade creation and 
trade diversion dummies for the CER are defined over the entire sample period.   9 
capture the average increase (decrease) in trade diversion from nonmember sources after 
the agreement came into force.
5 
  Eighteen time dummies are introduced to control for other important factors 
influencing world agricultural trade, namely the increase in world agricultural trade over 
the sample period.  The year 1985 is subsumed into the intercept.  The unobserved 
heterogeneity of countries is captured using fixed effects. The fixed effects variables help 
proxy other country-specific factors not included in the model, such as changes in 
political regimes, macroeconomic shocks and other idiosyncratic factors. 
    The semi-logarithmic functional form of equation [5] allows us to interpret the 
regression coefficients that are not dummy variables as elasticities.  Holding constant the 
other explanatory variables, β1+β3  (or β2+β4) represents the percentage change in VTijt 
given a one percent change in GDPi (GDPj) for the exporting (importing) country.  We 
expect the signs of these coefficients to be positive and statistically significant because of 
the direct impact of GDP on import demand and the fact that larger exporting countries 
tend to trade more.  β5 is a proxy for all trade barriers that affect trade between countries i 
and j.
6 We expect β5 to be negative and statistically significant as higher bilateral trade 
and transport costs (i.e. greater shipment distances) reduce the propensity to trade. 
    The variables of interest in this study are the direction and magnitude of the trade 
creation and trade diversion.  We expect the coefficient on TradeCijht in equation [5] to be 
                                                 
5 Readers may criticize this method because in some instances more than one trade creation or trade 
diversion dummy variable is active for a particular trade flow.  However, in world trade many countries are 
often members of several RTAs concurrently.  Given that we have pooled all cross sectional trade flows for 
18 years of agricultural trade data totaling over 56,000 observations and the fact the RTA agreements were 
signed in different years, it seems reasonable to believe that the trade creation and trade diversion 
coefficients are picking up variation in trade flows specific to a particular agreement.  Later in the paper, 
we perform a robustness check to validate this specification.   
6 Trade barriers can be in the form of border restrictions predominant in agriculture, transport and 
distribution costs, an international border as well as information costs.    10 
positive and significant as the elimination of significant border restrictions should 
encourage intra-regional bloc trade.  However this is an important empirical question 
because like the WTO, many RTAs maintain trade restrictions for certain agricultural 
commodities. Tthe coefficient on TradeDijlt will be negative and significant if trade 
creation within a particular RTA came at the expense of trade with nonmembers.   
    We push this framework a step further and calculate the percentage increase or 
decrease in trade creation and trade diversion due to the signing of an RTA using a 
simple nonlinear transformation.  Consider a simplified semi-logarithmic regression 
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where Xi represent continuous explanatory variables and Di is a set of dummy variables.  
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Thus the coefficient of a continuous variable is the elasticity of V for a small change in 
the explanatory variable Xi.  However, a dummy variable is a discontinuous variable and 
the derivative of V with respect to a small change in Di does not exist.  Instead, we can 
calculate the percentage change in V going from V0 to V1 for a discrete change in Di from 
0 to 1 as,
7 
                                                 
7We use the multivariate Delta method to derive the asymptotic variances of the trade creation and trade 
diversion estimates Previous studies have used equation [8] to calculate percent changes in the coefficients 
involving a dummy variable without regard to the properties of the variance-covariance estimates when 
using a nonlinear transformation.   Note that equation [8] is a continuous and differentiable function.  Let 
100 * ) 1 ) (exp( − = γ g and let  ) ˆ var(γ be the OLS variance from equation [5].  Then using the multivariate 
Delta method, the asymptotic variance of a nonlinear transformation such as [8] is: 
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   Implicit in the RTA dummy variables is the implied ad valorem equivalent of the 
pre-RTA border cost.  Let the ad valorem trade cost increase in distance according to  
, ) ( ) ( 1 δ
ij Dist Dist t = and denote the ad-valorem trade cost savings from the formation of the 
RTA (TradeCijt) as (δh).
8  Assuming that this proxy for the pre-RTA border cost enters 
multiplicatively the trade barrier function is  ), exp( ) ( 0
h ij DIST t δ
δ = for h = 0…8 (i.e. one 
distance parameter and 8 RTA parameters).  The trade barrier coefficient for distance is 
interpreted as  ) ( 0 5 σ δ β = − = h and for the pre-RTA border  ) (σ δ α h h = for h = 1…8. 
Data 
  Time series bilateral trade data (Vijt) in millions of U.S. dollars for 9 agricultural 
commodities are taken from the Comtrade database and aggregated to the GTAP regional 
level which includes 87 countries and regions.   All GDP and population data are taken 
from the World Bank Development Indicators which reports GDP data in U.S. dollars.  
Distance measures and contiguity and common language indicators are taken from the 
Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Informations Internationales (CEPII).  Distances are 
calculated following the great circle formula, which uses latitudes and longitudes of the 
most important cities/agglomerations in terms of population.  
      A pooled, cross sectional, time series regression of equation [5] is estimated for 
18 years of trade data (1985-2002) and for 11 regression scenarios.  Nine of these 
                                                 
8 Note that contiguity, common language, and access to a sea port (landlocked) also involve trade cost 
savings. We have not included these coefficients in the trade cost function because we are really interested 
in the ad valorem tariff equivalent of the pre-RTA border cost.     12 
regressions are for individual agricultural commodities and the remaining two scenarios 
are for all agricultural and non agricultural commodities.  Table 2 lists the HS 2 industry 
used to classify the nine individual agricultural commodities along with a description of 
the products included in these industries.  In total, there are 86 countries that potentially 
export to 85 other countries for 18 years.  Thus there are 131,580 possible bilateral trade 
observations (86*85*18) for a single commodity.  Tables 3 through 5 displays the 
number of observations after eliminating all non-trading countries (zero trade values). 
Results 
The econometric results from the 11 regression scenarios are displayed in tables 3 
through 5.  The regression scenarios are labeled 1 through 11 accordingly.  The standard 
gravity estimates are displayed in table 3.  Table 4 presents the trade creation and trade 
diversion coefficient estimates where trade diversion estimates are shown in parentheses. 
Finally, for convenience tables 6 and 7 display the percentage change in trade creation 
and trade diversion using equation [5] with the upper and lower 90 percent confidence 
levels in parentheses. 
    In terms of the standard gravity estimates, table 3 shows that the implied income 
elasticities (GDP + per capita GDP) are positive and significant in nearly all cases.  
However, the magnitudes of these estimates are lower than the estimates found in the 
literature which typically range from 0.70 to 1.20 (see for example Frankel and Wei 
1997, Anderson and van Wincoop 2003).  Regression 11 for non agricultural goods 
supports this where the implied income elasticity is 0.90 and 0.70 for the exporting and 
importing country respectively.  The smaller income elasticities for agriculture is to be 
expected for two reasons. One, usually agriculture makes up a much smaller percentage   13 
of national GDP than manufacturing or industrial goods. Two we typically view raw 
agricultural commodities as necessities so that when national income rises, countries may 
choose to trade higher valued non-agricultural goods especially from the perspective of 
an importing country.  The GDP coefficients also suggest that larger countries trade more 
than do smaller countries but a one percent increase in the economic size of a nation 
(proxied by GDP) brings a much smaller increase in the value of agricultural trade than in 
non agricultural trade (compare the GDP coefficients in regressions 10 and 11).   
    Distance is negative and significant in 5 of the 9 individual agricultural 
commodities (regressions 1 through 9) and for all agriculture and non agriculture 
regressions (regressions 10 and 11).  In this case, the coefficient on distance for trade in 
agricultural goods is roughly half the distance coefficient in non agricultural trade. This 
may reflect the fact that many agricultural products are shipped by ground transportation. 
The contiguity, common language and landlocked coefficients all have the expected sign 
and are significant at the one percent level.         
Trade Creation and Trade Diversion  
This section discusses the empirical results of trade creation and trade diversion in eight 
RTAs listed in Table 2.  Tables 5 shows the percentage increase/decrease in trade 
creation and table 6 shows how much of this increase/decrease came at the expense of 
trade diversion with nonmembers.   
Trade Creation 
    NAFTA and the expansion of the European Union to 15 members (EU-15) show 
positive and significant trade creation effects for 8 out of 9 and 6 out of 9 individual 
agricultural commodities, respectively (table 4).  In NAFTA, the results are largest in the   14 
case of bovine cattle, vegetables and fruit and oilseeds. For these commodities, the 
magnitude of the coefficients suggest that two NAFTA members traded an additional 361 
percent in the case of bovine cattle, 511 percent in the case of vegetables and fruits and 
an additional 264 percent in the case of oilseeds. Using an elasticity of substitution of 5, 
the implied tariff equivalent of the pre-RTA border cost for all agricultural commodities 
(regression 10) is 127 percent (100*exp(1.22/5)).  With an elasticity of substitution of 10 
the pre-RTA border is 112 percent. 
    A similar pattern emerges for trade in Mercosur, Africa and the Andean Pact and 
for 8 agricultural commodities in the CER and APEC, the exception being Cattle.  For 
trade in all agricultural commodities (regression 10) for these RTAs, the ad valorem tariff 
equivalent of the pre-RTA border ranges from a low of 115 (Africa) to a high of 206 
(CER) using an elasticity of substitution of 5.   This suggests that bound tariff costs alone 
which average 62 percent in world agricultural trade (Gibson et al 2001) account for 
roughly one-third of total trade costs.
9  On this criterion, regional trade agreements would 
have to be considered a major success. 
    AFTA shows that trade decreased after the formation of the agreement in 5 out of 
9 commodities.  However, this is not surprising given that AFTA is composed of five 
Southeast Asian nations who do not necessarily have a strong comparative advantage in 
agricultural production.   
    In summary, the results suggest that RTAs may be an important avenue for trade 
liberalization in agriculture.  In fact, if we compare the trade creation effects for all 
agriculture versus non agricultural trade (regressions 10 and 11) we see that in 5 out of 9 
                                                 
9 However, countries often apply tariff rates below their bound levels suggesting that applied rates make up 
a much smaller fraction of the total trade cost.   15 
cases, the magnitude of trade creation in agricultural trade exceeds that of non 
agricultural trade. The explanation for this relates to the fact that the GATT/WTO has 
been successful in creating an integrated world economy for trade in non agricultural 
goods, whereas trade in agricultural goods has only recently been brought under its 
governance.  While significant trade restrictions existed in agriculture before the 
formation of an RTA the reduction or elimination of these barriers likely lead to a much 
larger percentage increase in post-RTA trade relative to pre-RTA trade.    
Trade Diversion 
    For convenience, table 4 presents the results for trade diversion in square brackets 
under those of trade creation. Table 6 shows the magnitude of trade diversion and the 90 
percent confidence interval constructed using the multivariate Delta method. 
    The signing of NAFTA appears to have come at little expense of trade diversion 
with nonmembers (Table 4).  In terms of all agricultural commodities (regression 10), 
NAFTA imports from a nonmembers averaged 11 percent less after 1994 (with 90 
percent confidence that this number lies between -4 and -19 percent in repeated samples, 
table 6).  To put this in context, a 240 percent trade creation effect for all agriculture 
(table 4) suggests that the signing of NAFTA may have increased welfare for its 
members.  Interestingly, vegetables and fruit (regression 5) and other food products 
(regression 9) are the only statistically significant and negative trade diversion effects 
across individual commodities at -18 and -9 percent respectively (table 6). However, 
trade creation far outweighs trade diversion for these commodities. 
    A different story emerges in the EU-15 where positive trade creation effects are 
almost offset by negative trade diversion effects for vegetables and fruit, wheat and   16 
durum, other crops and other food.  In the case of wheat and durum and other crops 
(regressions 6 and 8), negative trade diversion effects exceed trade creation (tables 5 and 
6) suggesting that the expansion of the European Union to 15 members may have reduced 
welfare in a few agricultural commodities. To get a rough idea of the magnitude of the 
decrease in welfare, note that in terms of value the average bilateral trade flow for wheat 
and durum and other crops is 40 million and 30 million U.S. dollars (USD) respectively.  
With no statistically significant trade creation effects in these two commodities, the 
welfare loss from trade diversion is roughly 12.5 million and 9.6 million USD times the 
cost difference on imports between members and nonmembers.
10   
    Trade is diverted from nonmember sources in Mercosur for three products, bovine 
cattle, wheat and durum and oils seeds (table 6).  However, trade diversion is more than 
offset by the magnitude of trade creation in these same products (table 5).  Furthermore, 
the trade creation effect in Mercosur for all agriculture is among the highest at 384 
percent.  Because trade creation is unambiguously welfare improving, it is likely that the 
signing of Mercosur was welfare improving for its members despite some trade diversion 
in certain commodities. 
    Trade diversion was most prominent among APEC members where 7 out of 9 
commodities showed negative and significant trade diversion effects (table 4). In fact, 
trade diversion exceeded trade creation in 4 out of 9 commodities (bovine cattle, sugar, 
vegetables and fruit and other crops, tables 5 and 6).  This result suggests that the 
formation of APEC may be welfare decreasing even though no formal agreement exists 
                                                 
10 Alternatively, the EU-15 members traded an average of 40 million dollars in wheat with nonmembers 
before the expansion to 15 members but only traded an average of 40*(1-0.31) = 27.6 million dollars in 
wheat after the expansion.  The difference in trade for other crops is calculated analogously.    17 
among its members.
11  At the other extreme, the CER agreement boosted trade among its 
members in every commodity except Bovine Cattle and increased trade with 
nonmembers after the agreement was signed.  Dairy products and other food 
commodities stand out. The results suggest that two CER members traded an additional 
582 (766) percent more dairy (other food) commodities after the RTA was signed and 
traded an additional 499 (577) percent with nonmembers.   
    Regional trade agreements involving South African countries diverted trade from 
nonmember sources in 7 out of 9 commodities.  However only 4 out of these 9 
commodities are statistically significant and in no case does trade diversion outweigh the 
trade creating effects of this agreement.  The formation of AFTA boosted trade with 
nonmembers in 4 out of nine commodities (Bovine Cattle, Other Livestock, Dairy 
Products, Other Crops and Other Food).  The remaining trade diversion coefficients are 
insignificant.  Again, this result is to be expected.  Table 5 shows that two AFTA 
members actually traded less with each other after the formation of the agreement 
because AFTA members do not specialize in production or exports of agricultural 
commodities. Thus we expect to see a positive trade diversion coefficient implying that 
AFTA members rely more on imports from larger countries that specialize in production 
and exports.  Finally, in terms of the relative magnitude of trade creation and trade 
diversion, the Andean Pact increased intra-regional trade among its members in 6 
agricultural commodities with dairy products and oil seeds showing the highest trade 
creation effects.  
                                                 
11 In this study APEC is treated as an RTA although no formal agreement has been signed by its members.   18 
An Alternative Specification 
While we can never be sure we have the true model underlying the data, we can check to 
see if an alternative specification will authenticate our results.  Instead of using the full 
model as in equation [5] which includes all RTAs simultaneously, we can restrict our 
attention to the set of bilateral trade observation that only involves at least one or both 
RTA members (i.e. importer, exporter or both).  For example, in the case of Nafta, the set 
of bilateral trade observations is reduced to those observations where at least one or both 
members of Nafta are involved.  We repeat this exercise for the eight RTA’s (table 3) 
running separate regressions for each agreement.  The trade creation and trade diversion 
dummies are defined as in equation [5] but only for the RTA being evaluated.    
    Figure 4 presents the trade creation and trade diversion results of eight separate 
regressions (called the bloc model in figure 4) for the case of all agriculture (regression 
10) and compares them to the full model results using equation [5].   The results reveal 
the magnitude of trade creation is greater in the full model than in the bloc model in all 
RTAs except AFTA. This is to be expected because the dummy variables are relative to 
the average trade flow in the model.  For example, in terms of value, average trade 
between two Nafta members is the highest among all RTAs for trade in agricultural 
commodities.  In the full model where the average flow includes all countries, the 
percentage increase in Nafta trade creation will be higher than in the bloc model which 
only includes intra and extra-regional Nafta trade.  This is because Nafta trade is large 
and the increase in Nafta trade after 1994 is greater if the base comparison is the average 
world trade flow versus if the base comparison is relative to pre-Nafta trade flows. We 
would be more concerned if a coefficient switched signs when estimating the bloc model.    19 
This does not happen in any case. Thus, in the case of trade creation, the bloc model 
results reinforce our findings that significant trade creation has occurred in agriculture for 
all RTAs.
12  
    In terms of trade diversion, again the bloc model reinforces our full model results.  
In one half of the cases, the magnitude of trade diversion is greater in the bloc model 
(Nafta, EU-15, APEC and AFTA).  Mercosur diverted trade from nonmemebers under 
the bloc model, but increased trade with nonmembers under the full model.  Again this 
results can be explained in terms of the average flow.  In the full model, two Mercosur 
members traded more with nonmembers on average relative to the average world trade 
fllow after the agreement was signed, but traded less with nonmembers in the bloc model 
relative to the average Mercosur trade flow.   
    In summary, our alternative specification supports the claim that RTAs have 
generally increased agricultural trade between members but the magnitude of this 
increase depends on the average flow it is being compared to.  In only three cases did the 
trade creation effect come at the expense of trade diversion with nonmembers (Nafta, 
EU-15 and APEC).  However, the magnitude of trade creation exceeds trade diversion in 
every case except for the EU-15. 
Conclusion    
Agricultural trade has only recently been brought under the auspices of the WTO under a 
separate agreement. However, relative to trade in non-agricultural goods, progress in 
achieving agricultural trade liberalization under the WTO has been slow.  The 
implementation of Article XXIV of the GATT, 1947 permits a group of countries to form 
                                                 
12In the case of the CER agreement between Australia and New Zealand, the magnitude of trade creation in 
the full model is far greater than in the bloc model (3687% versus 260%).  More work is needed to 
determine the cause of this discrepancy.    20 
a trade union whereby duties and other trade barriers are reduced or removed on all 
sectors of trade in the group and nonmembers should not find trade with the group any 
more restrictive than before the group was established. 
    Within regional trade agreements however, agricultural trade often receives 
special treatment in the form of maintaining higher duties over longer periods of time, 
and in some cases by completely exempting agricultural barriers from the reduction 
commitments within the agreement.   
    Very little is known about the extent of trade creation and trade diversion across 
individual agricultural commodities. This study addressed the fundamental question of 
what effect RTAs have had on trade.  To answer this question we developed an extended 
gravity model to estimate the magnitude of trade creation and trade diversion across 9 
individual agricultural commodities and for 8 RTAs .   
    The results indicate that agricultural trade in NAFTA and the CER has been very 
responsive to a decrease in trade restrictions.  In 8 out of 9 commodities (the exception 
being dairy products), trade creation in NAFTA exceeded 75 percent and was over 200 
percent in 3 commodities (cattle, vegetables and fruit and oil seeds).  Furthermore, almost 
all of NAFTA and CER trade creation came at the expense of little or no trade diversion 
with nonmembers suggesting that these both agreements increased the welfare of its 
members. 
    The EU-15 and African agreements also show positive trade creation effects but 
the magnitudes are roughly half of those in NAFTA and the CER.  However, both the 
EU-15 and African agreements show negative and significant trade diversion effects in 7 
out of 9 and 5 out of 9 commodities.  In 5 out of 9 cases in the EU-15 and in only 1 out of   21 
9 cases in Africa, trade diversion exceeded trade creation.  Although the welfare effects 
are ambiguous when trade creation and trade diversion effects are similar, it is possible 
that welfare in agriculture may have decreased with the expansion of the European Union 
to 15 members. 
    Two AFTA members actually reduced intra-regional trade across agricultural 
commodities after the agreement was ratified but much of this loss was offset by 
increased imports from nonmembers.  In this situation the welfare results depend on the 
cost of importing from nonmembers and the size of the external RTA tariff.  On the other 
hand, APEC members created trade across all commodities but much of this came at the 
expense of reduced imports from nonmembers.  For trade in cattle and vegetables, trade 
diversion was greater than trade creation. 
    Finally, both Mercosur and the Andean Pact created trade with the exception of 
cattle in the Andean Pact.  However, significant trade diversion in cattle, wheat and 
durum, and oilseeds occurred in Mercosur and in other livestock in the Andean Pact.     
    Are regional trade agreements building blocks or stumbling blocks in the reform 
of agricultural trade?  Our extended gravity model results suggest that a majority of 
regional trade agreements are an effective avenue to promote multilateral free trade.  
Furthermore with only a few commodity specific exceptions, regional trade agreements 
have increased trade with nonmembers even as the members have increased trade among 
themselves to a greater extent.  Thus, regional trade agreements are an attractive 
alternative for countries wishing to speed up the move towards multilateral free trade in 
agriculture.   22 
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Table 1.  Regional Trade Agreement members and year of signing 
 
No. Regional  Trade 
Agreement 
Members  Year 
Signed 
1  North Amercian Free 
Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) 
•  United States, Canada, Mexico  1994 
2 Mercosur  (Southern 
Common Market) 
•  Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay  1995 
3 European  Union 
expansion to 15 
members (EU-15) 
•  Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, 
United Kingdom, Greece. Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Denmark, Austria, Finland, Sweden 
1995 
4 Closer  Economic 
Relations (CER)* 
•  Australia, New Zealand  1983 
5 AFRICA  •  Members from the South African 
Customs Union (SACU), the South 
African Development Community 
(SADC) and the Common Market for 
East and South Africa (COMESA) 
1996 
6  Association of South 
East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Free Trade 
Agreement (AFTA) 
•  Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand 
1992 
7 Asian-Pacific  Economic 
Cooperation (APEC)* 
•  Australia, Canada, Chile, China, Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Mexico, 
Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, 
Philippines, Russia, Singapore, 
Thailand, Taiwan, United States, 
Vietnam 
1989 
8 Andean  Pact  •  Venezuela, Columbia, Peru, Bolivia, 
Ecuador 
1993 
* According to the WTO notifications, APEC is not a regional trade agreement because it lacks a formal 
agreement among its members.   
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